

**THE FOURTH PARTY PLENUM
AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION IN CHINA**

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Executive Summary

1. Ahead of the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic on 1 October 2009, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its Fourth Plenum from 15 to 18 September 2009.
2. The Plenum has affirmed the Politburo's performance in handling a series of challenges in the past year, including the Wenchuan earthquake, the Beijing Olympics, the global financial crisis, and the ethnic tensions.
3. It has also outlined four major challenges in governance, reform and opening, market economy, and external environment. The Party would continue to strengthen itself as the backbone of the Chinese people and to lead China's development.
4. On the issue of anti-corruption, the Plenum stressed the combination of preventive measures with punitive measures.
5. In the subsequent meeting of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission, it was decided that the CCP would require government and Party leaders to include information on their family assets in their reports to the Party.
6. However, social supervision as a principle was not introduced and there were no concrete measures on publicizing the assets of public officials.
7. The CCP would further promote intra-Party democracy, in particular grassroots intra-Party democracy, in order to develop people's democracy.
8. Most surprisingly, there is no word on the long anticipated appointment of Xi Jinping (习近平) as the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC).

9. One possibility is the postponement of the discussion on succession to a later date because of the more immediate issue of the forthcoming National Day celebration.
10. Another possibility is the need to have a longer probationary period for Xi before his entry into the CMC, suggesting an interesting role of the military in the leadership succession process.
11. The delay of Xi's appointment might also invite his competitors (including Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang (李克强) and Chongqing Party Boss Bo Xilai (薄熙来)) to join the race to the top.
12. Although there is no imminent danger of losing his candidacy, Xi would have to double his efforts to secure his position in the next few years.

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BO Zhiyue*

An Important Meeting at a Critical Time

- 1.1 The Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), a gathering of national political elites on most important issues facing China, was held in Beijing from 15 to 18 September 2009.
- 1.2 Following an eventful year of 2008, 2009 is marked as a year of anniversaries. The year starts with the 50th Anniversary of the Tibetan Uprising in March, followed by the 20th Anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident in June, and culminating to the 60th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in October.
- 1.3 In a year of global economic crisis, social stability in China remains elusive. Among numerous social protests and riots, the 5 July Urumqi riot was the most salient. With almost 200 people dead and 1,700 injured, the riot caught the attention of the international media and the national leadership.
- 1.4 Moreover, the riot produced another anti-China political celebrity, Rebiya Kadeer (born in 1951),¹ a Uyghur woman who has been promoting the “human rights” and “democracy” of the Uyghur people in other countries.

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¹ For her biographical information, see <http://news.sohu.com/20070107/n247464491.shtml>. Another source says that she was born in 21 January 1947. See <http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%83%AD%E6%AF%94%E5%A8%85%C2%B7%E5%8D%A1%E5%BE%B7%E5%B0%94>.

- 1.5 In the meantime, the CCP continues to be plagued by corruption. At least eight high officials have been either disciplined or tried for their involvement in corruption cases within a year, including two Central Committee full members and one Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC) member.
- 1.6 Moreover, it is critical whether concrete measures on intra-Party democracy would be introduced so that the Party can meet growing demands for political participation of ordinary Party members.
- 1.7 Most importantly, a succession plan has to be institutionalised so that the heir apparent could gain experiences in military affairs as well as Party affairs in preparation for taking over the helm as the top Party leader and commander-in-chief in a few years.

The Fourth Plenum's Significance in Chinese Politics

- 2.1 An important decision-making body in Chinese politics, the Central Committee of the CCP usually meets once or twice each year. Different plenary sessions serve different functions (see Appendix 1).
- 2.2 The First Plenum immediately follows the Party Congress and elects Politburo members, Politburo Standing Committee members, and the General Secretary; approves members of the Secretariat nominated by the Politburo Standing Committee; decides on members of the Central Military Commission (CMC); and approves the Secretary, deputy secretaries, and standing members of the Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission (CDIC) elected by the CDIC.
- 2.3 The Second Plenum usually prepares for the National People's Congress (NPC). It would introduce institutional changes to the State Council and nominate state leaders in the NPC Standing Committee, the State Council, and the Chinese National People's Political Consultative Conference.
- 2.4 The Third Plenum usually deals with economic issues. Starting with the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in December 1978 that officially

launched economic reforms in China, every subsequent Third Plenum has been devoted to introducing economic reform measures ever since.

- 2.5 The Fourth Plenum is usually a “politics” plenum, dealing with political issues such as “Party building” and personnel changes in the Politburo and the Central Military Commission (CMC). On occasion, the Fourth Plenum could also witness leadership succession.
- 2.6 The Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee, held from 23 to 24 June 1989, revamped the top leadership in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, officially inaugurating the third generation leadership. The Fourth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee, held from 25 to 28 September 1994, marked the formal power transfer from the second generation leadership to the third generation leadership.
- 2.7 Hu Jintao was installed as the first vice chairman of the CMC at the Fourth Plenum of the 15th Central Committee from 19 to 22 September 1999, consolidating his position as the heir apparent; and Jiang Zemin stepped down as the CMC chairman at the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee from 16 to 19 September 2004, marking the end of Jiang’s era.

Major Issues of the Fourth Plenum

- 3.1 One issue the Fourth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee touched on was anti-corruption. In spite of its stringent measures in recent years, the CCP continues to be plagued by corruption. In the past year or so, at least eight high officials at the rank of vice minister and above have been disciplined for their involvement in corruption cases (see Appendix 2 for a list of major cases).
- 3.2 The Plenum pledged to take anti-corruption as an important political task and emphasized the combination of preventive measures with punitive measures. It paid particular attention on more effective preventive measures in terms of education, supervision, reform, and institutional innovations.

- 3.3 In the subsequent meeting of the CDIC on 19 September 2009, it was decided that the CCP would investigate corruption cases that triggered mass protest incidents and request government and Party leaders to include their information on housing, investment, and professions of their spouses and children in their reports on important personal events.²
- 3.4 However, there is no sign that the Party is ready to adopt concrete measures to subject public officials to social supervision. Premier Wen Jiabao indicated in his internet chat with netizens on 28 February 2009 that the Chinese government was preparing to establish a system for publicizing the assets of government officials.³ But social supervision as a principle was not introduced at the Fourth Plenum. Nor was this concrete measure of publicizing the assets of public officials introduced at the CDIC meeting, despite high social expectations.⁴
- 3.5 Another important theme for the Fourth Plenum was intra-Party democracy. In the political report to the 17th National Party Congress in October 2007, Hu Jintao mentioned the term “democracy” 62 times.⁵
- 3.6 Hu paid particular attention to intra-Party democracy in the document and wanted to promote intra-Party democracy in order to develop people’s democracy and increase intra-Party harmony in order to promote social harmony. According to Hu, the CCP would take steps to promote intra-Party democracy.

² “中国共产党第十七届中央纪律检查委员会第四次全体会议公报,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-09/19/content_12080735.htm.

³ For details, see http://www.xinhuanet.com/zlft/page_4.htm.

⁴ This proposal is not included in a five-year anti-corruption program from 2008 to 2012. For the details of this program, see “建立健全惩治和预防腐败体系 2008—2012 年工作规划,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-06/22/content_8417974.htm.

⁵ For details, see <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/106155/106156/6430009.html>.

3.7 These steps include firstly, reintroducing a tenure system for deputies to Party congresses at various levels (Article 11) in the revised CCP Constitution.⁶ In the past, deputies to Party congresses at various levels usually served their functions for a few days. Now according to the new rule, they are supposed to serve for a term of three to five years. This is being implemented at the local and grassroots levels on a trial basis in a few places (see Chart 1).

CHART 1 THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATION

Central Organizations	The Politburo Standing Committee The Politburo Central Committee National Congress
Local Organizations	Provincial Party Committee Provincial Party Congress
	Prefectural Party Committee
	Municipal Party Committee Municipal Party Congress
	County Party Committee County Party Congress
Grassroots Organizations	Town (Township) Party Committee Town (Township) Party Congress
	Village (Neighborhood) Party General Branch Village (Neighborhood) Party Meeting
	Party Branch in factories, schools, shops, etc. Party meeting in these places

Source: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/106155/106156/6439183.html>

⁶ The tenure system was first introduced in the CCP Constitution adopted in 1956 but the practice was discontinued later on.

- 3.8 Secondly, expanding the power of the plenary sessions of the Party committee. Instead of being decided by the top Party leaders, personnel issues will be decided by the vote of the plenary sessions.
- 3.9 Thirdly, reforming the electoral system, especially the way candidates for Party posts are nominated. In the past, candidates for key positions were nominated by a few Party leaders; now they will have to be democratically nominated.
- 3.10 The Fourth Plenum continued to place emphasis on intra-Party democracy, in particular, intra-Party democracy at the grassroots levels. The CCP takes intra-Party democratic development as the foundation for Party building as a whole.⁷ To make this point clear, some grassroots deputies and grassroots Party members were also invited to attend the Plenum.
- 3.11 However, intra-Party democracy could also serve as an avenue for elite politics maneuvering among potential power contenders.

Xi Jinping Failed to Enter the CMC

- 4.1 What is most surprising, however, is that there was no word on the appointment of Xi Jinping (born in 1953) as the first vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the Fourth Plenum.
- 4.2 Xi, the son of Xi Zhongxun (习仲勋) (1913-2002) (former vice premier of the State Council), has been regarded as the heir apparent to Hu Jintao since 2007. He has followed the footsteps of Hu Jintao in his march toward the top position in the Party.
- 4.3 After becoming No. 6 leader in the Politburo Standing Committee in October 2007, he subsequently took over as the president of the Central Party School and state vice president. He was widely expected to enter the CMC at this

⁷ “授权发布：中国共产党第十七届中央委员会第四次全体会议公报，” http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-09/18/content_12076251.htm.

plenum, a key step toward a smooth succession at the next Party congress in 2012.

- 4.4 The idea of consolidating the powers of the Party and the military into the hands of one person started in 1987 when General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was also made the first vice chairman of the CMC. But that particular transition was never completed due to the Tiananmen Incident one and a half years later.
- 4.5 Jiang Zemin was an aberration. He took over in November 1989 as the CMC chairman without any probationary period as the first vice chairman, not due to his abilities but because of Deng Xiaoping's insistence.
- 4.6 The previous system of power transfer was resumed when Hu Jintao was made the first vice chairman of the CMC in 1999 and later as CMC chairman, replacing Jiang Zemin in 2004, two years after he had become the general secretary of the Party.
- 4.7 In contrast to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao who had had no military experiences before they assumed the military leadership, Xi did have some experience in the military. After his graduation from the Qinghua University in April 1979, he worked in the General Office of the CMC for about three years.
- 4.8 He was the personal secretary of Geng Biao (耿飏) (1909-2000), the then vice premier, Politburo member, secretary general of the CMC, and defense minister. In 1982, however, Xi decided to leave Beijing to gain experiences at lower levels. He was appointed deputy Party secretary of the Zhengding County in Hebei.
- 4.9 Since he became a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, Xi has been in charge of several important tasks, including Hong Kong and Macao affairs

and the Beijing Olympics. He has been credited for his leadership in a successful and safe Olympics.⁸

4.10 According to a report from *Ming Pao* (a newspaper based in Hong Kong), the Plenum approved the appointment of Xi as the first vice chairman of the CMC in principle and an announcement would be made at an expanded CMC meeting after the National Day celebration.⁹

4.11 From the fact that Xi made a report explaining the draft version of the final resolution on Party building, it is clear that he is still considered the heir apparent to Hu Jintao. But it is unclear if the Plenum actually made the appointment.

4.12 When Hu himself was inducted into the CMC at the Fourth Plenum of the 15th Central Committee in 1999, the decision was immediately announced in the communiqué of the Plenum.¹⁰

4.13 It is possible that the CCP top leadership is postponing the discussion of the succession to a later date simply because of the more immediate issue of the forthcoming National Day celebration. Like the 35th anniversary celebration for Deng Xiaoping in 1984 and the 50th anniversary celebration for Jiang Zemin, the 60th anniversary celebration would be a crowning moment for Hu Jintao.

4.14 It is also possible that the military leaders feel that Xi needs a longer probationary period before his entry into the CMC. Some military leaders

⁸ However, he played no role in handling the Urumqi riots. The riots, which led to almost 200 people dead and 1,700 injured, erupted on 5 July. But Xi went on a scheduled tour of Liaoning Province from 6 to 8 July 2009. He did not return to Beijing until Hu Jintao interrupted his trip to Europe and flew from Italy to Beijing on 8 July 2009. For details, see http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2009-07/09/content_292155.htm; http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2009-07/08/content_291478.htm.

⁹ “习近平任军委副主席四中全会通过,” http://www.dwnews.com/gb/MainNews/Forums/BackStage/2009_9_17_21_41_36_859.html.

¹⁰ “中国共产党第十五届中央委员会第四次全体会议公报,” http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-03/22/content_2728775.htm.

reportedly asserted that the future CMC chairman did not have to be decided at the Fourth Plenum and that Xi did not have enough experience in military affairs. They suggested that his probationary period should be extended to avoid an undemocratic decision.¹¹ For whatever reasons, it seems that Xi's position as the heir apparent is not yet completely consolidated.

4.15 The fact that Xi was not inducted to the CMC at this plenum would have significant implications for China's elite politics. Hu Jintao might follow Jiang Zemin's step and continue to serve as the CMC chairman after he steps down from the positions of general secretary and state president in 2012-2013. Given Xi's later entry into the CMC, Hu might stay for another full five-year term instead of two or three years. In this scenario, Xi's power as the top Party leader would be significantly undermined.

4.16 There are concerns about the role of the military in China's succession politics, exerting undue influence under the guise of intra-Party democracy.

4.17 The delay of Xi's appointment might also invite his competitors (including Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang (李克强) and Chongqing Party Boss Bo Xilai (薄熙来)) to join the race to the top, putting further pressure on the heir apparent.¹² Although there is no imminent danger of losing his candidacy, Xi would have to double his efforts to secure his position in the next few years.

¹¹ 任慧文, “习近平四中出任军委副主席?” http://rayswchiu-ej.blogspot.com/2009/09/blog-post_2043.html.

¹² John Garnaut, “Chinese puzzle: Who is Hu's heir?” *The Age*, 21 September 2009, <http://www.theage.com.au/world/chinese-puzzle-who-is-hus-heir-20090920-fwq7.html>.

**APPENDIX 1 THE NATIONAL CONGRESSES OF THE CCP AND THE
PLENUMS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEES (1982-2009)**

Meetings	Participants	Dates	Agenda
CCP Twelfth National Congress, Beijing	1545D/149AD	1-11 Sep. 1982	Revise CCP Constitution; elect CC members; elect CDIC members; elect CAC members
1st Plenum, 12th CC, Beijing	210F/138A	12-13 Sep. 1982	Elect Politburo and Secretariat members; decide CMC chair and vice chairs
2nd Plenum, 12th CC, Beijing	201F/136A	11-12 Oct. 1983	Party rectification
3rd Plenum, 12th CC, Beijing	321	20 Oct. 1984	Economic reform
4th Plenum, 12th CC, Beijing	202F/128A	16 Sep. 1985	7th Five-Year Plan
CCP National Conference, Beijing	933D	18-23 Sep. 1985	Retirement of 64 members
5th Plenum, 12th CC, Beijing	202F/128A	24 Sep. 1985	Personnel changes at the Politburo and the Secretariat
6th Plenum, 12th CC, Beijing	199F/126A	28 Sep. 1986	Spiritual civilization construction
7th Plenum, 12th CC, Beijing	202F/122A	20 Oct. 1987	Political reform and the change of General Secretary of the CCP
CCP Thirteenth National Congress, Beijing	1936D/61SD	25 Oct.-1 Nov. 1987	Revise CCP Constitution; elect CC members; elect CDIC members; elect CAC members
1st Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	173F/106A	2 Nov. 1987	Elect Politburo and Secretariat members; decide CMC chair, first vice chair, and standing vice chair
2nd Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	171F/107A	15-19 Mar. 1988	Nominate state leaders
3rd Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	165F/103A	26-30 Sep. 1988	Price reform
4th Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	170F/106A	23-24 June 1989	Change GS, Politburo Standing Committee, and Secretariat
5th Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	167F/106A	6-9 Nov. 1989	Economic retrenchment and CMC reshuffle
6th Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	166F/103A	9-12 Mar. 1990	Party-mass relations
7th Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	173F/107A	25-30 Dec. 1990	10-year program and 8th Five-Year Plan
8th Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	171F/105A	25-29 Nov. 1991	Agriculture and rural work
9th Plenum, 13th CC, Beijing	166F/105A	5-9 Oct. 1992	On the Fourteenth National Congress
CCP Fourteenth National Congress, Beijing	1898D/46SD	12-18 Oct. 1992	Revise CCP Constitution; elect CC members; elect CDIC members
1st Plenum, 14th CC, Beijing	188F/129A	19 Oct. 1992	Elect Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members; approve Secretariat members; decide CMC members; approve CDIC standing members
2nd Plenum, 14th CC, Beijing	184F/125A	5-7 Mar. 1993	8th Five-Year Plan; institutional reform; nomination of state leaders
3rd Plenum, 14th CC, Beijing	182F/128A	11-14 Nov. 1993	Market reform
4th Plenum, 14th CC, Beijing	182F/122A	25-28 Sep. 1994	Party building

5th Plenum, 14th CC, Beijing	176F/125A	25-28 Sep. 1995	9th Five-Year Plan and 2010 Long-term Goals
6th Plenum, 14th CC, Beijing	181F/124A	7-10 Oct. 1996	Spiritual civilization construction
7th Plenum, 14th CC, Beijing	182F/123A	6-9 Sep. 1997	On the Fifteenth National Congress
CCP Fifteenth National Congress, Beijing	2048D/60SD	12-18 Sep. 1997	Revise CCP Constitution; elect CC members; elect CDIC members
1st Plenum, 15th CC, Beijing	191F/151A	19 Sep. 1997	Elect Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members; approve Secretariat members; decide CMC members; approve CDIC standing members
2nd Plenum, 15th CC, Beijing	192F/149A	25-26 Feb. 1998	Institutional changes to the state council and nomination of state leaders
3rd Plenum, 15th CC, Beijing	185F/148A	12-14 Oct. 1998	Agriculture and rural work
4th Plenum, 15th CC, Beijing	189F/147A	19-22 Sep. 1999	State-owned Enterprise reform and CMC expansion
5th Plenum, 15th CC, Beijing	183F/144A	9-11 Oct. 2000	10th Five-Year Plan
6th Plenum, 15th CC, Beijing	190F/139A	24-26 Sep. 2001	Party work-style
7th Plenum, 15th CC, Beijing	186F/139A	3-5 Nov. 2002	On the Sixteenth National Congress
CCP Sixteenth National Congress, Beijing	2114D/40SD	8-14 Nov. 2002	Revise CCP Constitution; elect CC members; elect CDIC members
1st Plenum, 16th CC, Beijing	198F/158A	15 Nov. 2002	Elect Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members; approve Secretariat members; decide CMC members; approve CDIC standing members
2nd Plenum, 16th CC, Beijing	191F/151A	24-26 Feb. 2003	Nominate state leaders
3rd Plenum, 16th CC, Beijing	188F/154A	11-14 Oct. 2003	Market reform
4th Plenum, 16th CC, Beijing	194F/152A	16-19 Sep. 2004	Party governance capacity building and change of CMC chair; expansion of the CMC
5th Plenum, 16th CC, Beijing	191F/150A	8-11 Oct. 2005	11th Five-Year Plan; building new socialist countryside
6th Plenum, 16th CC, Beijing	195F/152A	8-11 Oct. 2006	Harmonious society building
7th Plenum, 16th CC, Beijing	190F/152A	9-12 Oct. 2007	On the Seventeenth National Congress
CCP Seventeenth National Congress, Beijing	2213D/57SD	15-21 Oct. 2007	Revise CCP Constitution; elect CC members; elect CDIC members
1st Plenum, 17th CC, Beijing	204F/166A	22 Oct. 2007	Elect Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members; approve Secretariat members; decide CMC members; approve CDIC standing members
2nd Plenum, 17th CC, Beijing	204F/167A	25-27 Feb. 2008	Institutional changes to the state council and nomination of state leaders
3rd Plenum, 17th CC, Beijing	202F/166A	9-12 Oct. 2008	Rural reform
4th Plenum, 17th CC, Beijing	194F/163A	15-18 Sep. 2009	Party building

Notes: D=Deputies; AD=Alternate Deputies; SD=Special Deputies; F=Full Members; A=Alternate Members
Source: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/index.html>

APPENDIX 2 RECENT MAJOR CORRUPTION CASES

1. At least eight high officials at the rank of vice minister and above have been disciplined for their involvement in corruption cases in the past year.
2. Pang Jiayu (庞家钰) (born in 1944), former vice chairman of Shaanxi Provincial People's Consultative Conference and former mayor of Baoji City (宝鸡市) in Shaanxi (陕西), was sentenced in June 2008 to 12 years' jail for taking bribes and dereliction of duties.¹³ He is better known as a “zipper mayor” and is reported to have been exposed by a team of 11 mistresses.¹⁴
3. Huang Songyou (黄松有) (born in 1957), former vice president of the Supreme People's Court, was disciplined in October 2008 for his possible involvement in a corruption case in Guangzhou where he and his collaborators allegedly made more than 400 million yuan flipping an unfinished building.¹⁵
4. Two former Guangdong officials, Chen Shaoji (陈绍基) (born in 1945), former chairman of the Guangdong Provincial People's Political Consultative Conference,¹⁶ and Wang Huayuan (王华元) (born in 1948), former secretary of the Disciplinary Inspection Commission in Zhejiang as well as in Guangdong,¹⁷ were both dismissed in April 2009 for their involvement in corruption cases. Chen was an alternate member of the 16th Central Committee,

¹³ “陕西省政协原副主席庞家钰一审判狱十二年,” http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200806/0628_17_622813.shtml

¹⁴ “11名情妇扳倒‘拉链市长’庞家钰的六大看点,” http://www.china.com.cn/news/txt/2007-09/09/content_8843712.htm. As a matter of fact, Pang was exposed by other officials than his mistresses. For details, see “庞家钰：民间举报力量的胜利,” http://read.dangdang.com/content_834853.

¹⁵ “最高法原副院长黄松有被指性贪高官,” http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200812/1203_17_905351.shtml.

¹⁶ For his biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-02/16/content_1315755.htm.

¹⁷ For his biographical information, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-02/16/content_1315755.htm.

and Wang was a member of the 16th and 17th Central Disciplinary Inspection Commission.

5. In 2009, Xu Zongheng (许宗衡) (born in July 1955), former mayor of Shenzhen, and Pi Qiansheng (皮黔生) (born in October 1951), former head of the Tianjin Binhai New Area, were both disciplined. Xu is currently under investigation¹⁸ while Pi has been expelled from the Party, and his case has been transferred to the judicial system for criminal charges.¹⁹
6. Finally, one full member of the 17th Central Committee was disciplined in 2007 and another is still under investigation since 2007. Yu Youjun (于幼军) (born in January 1953), former governor of Shanxi as well as mayor of Shenzhen, was dismissed from the Central Committee at the Third Plenum in October 2008 because of his involvement in corruption cases.
7. Kang Rixin (康日新) (born in August 1953), former general manager of China National Nuclear Corporation and the only full member of the 17th Central Committee among corporate leaders, was fired from his post in August 2009 because of his involvement in corruption cases.²⁰ He was replaced by Sun Qin (孙勤) (born in June 1953),²¹ deputy director of the State Energy Bureau.
8. You Youjun was replaced by Wang Xinxian (王新宪) (born in July 1954), Party group secretary of China Disabled Persons' Federation and president of China Paralympics Association, in the Central Committee. But Kang Rixin has not yet been dismissed because his case is still under investigation.

¹⁸ For his biographical information, see <http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/58318/58452/86548/86550/5919510.html>.

¹⁹ For more details, see Bo Zhiyue, "Tianjin City: Leadership Reshuffle and Economic Development," *EAI Background Brief*, No. 470 (20 August 2009), East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.

²⁰ <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2009-08-13/183018429336.shtml>.

²¹ For his biographical information, see <http://baike.baidu.com/view/488501.htm>.