Executive Summary

1. China has long been plagued by problems associated with East Turkestan separatism (疆独) and Islamic radicalism. The security threats in Xinjiang during the Beijing Olympics have gained international attention as China raised terror alerts.

2. The other reason for Xinjiang’s prominence is Russia’s move on Georgia which has placed China in a conundrum. In battling terrorism in Xinjiang, Russia’s support continues to be crucial for China.

3. If China does not lend any show of support for Russia over Georgia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was initiated as an anti-terror instrument at the height of Chinese fear of rising terrorism in Xinjiang, may diminish in credibility.

4. Since the fateful September 11 terrorist attacks, China has declared that four organizations, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement 「东伊运」, the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization, the World Uygur Youth Congress 「世维会」 and the East Turkistan Information Centre, are linked to al-Qaeda.

5. The US government, keen after the September 11 to enlist Chinese support in its efforts against terrorism, agreed to co-sponsor the inclusion of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement on the UN’s list of terrorist organizations.

6. US appeared to be standing with China on this issue but conflicting signals soon emerged. In December 2003 the US refused to support China’s request for a listing of another Uygur organization, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization.
7. For the moment, China’s strategy in dealing with Xinjiang is both hard and soft. Hard in cracking down terror and soft on economic development as a means to deliver progress and economic rewards to the people of Xinjiang.

8. Eventually, the West (especially the US) must also make a strategic decision to complement China on this leg of the global War on Terror or to use it to contain China by promoting separatism or democratization.
CHINA’S NEW BATTLE WITH TERRORISM IN XINJIANG

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Why Xinjiang now?

1.1 In the post-Olympics era and Russia’s move into Georgia, the Chinese government’s policies on regions traditionally seen as having separatist tendencies are becoming an important issue for both China’s domestic and international affairs. Due to the frequent occurrence of bloody terrorist attacks in the region, Xinjiang has become one of the most troublesome zones for the Chinese leadership.

1.2 Signs of the top leadership’s unease can be gathered from Nuer Baikeli’s (Chairman of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regional Government) 10,000-character-long speech to regional cadres on 10 September 2008. Chairman Baikeli blamed “Rebiya Kadeer and the East Turkistan” splittist forces for creating serious violent incidents, stating that “they are the major culprits behind the terrorist acts during the Olympics” and lambasting them as “vicious and conscience-less national splittists”.1

1.3 The speech was made before the Americans held memorial services on September 11 to honor the victims of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. By doing so, China wanted to remind the world that China too continues to face serious threats from terrorists.

1.4 Xinjiang has recently come into prominence due to the international attention on the Beijing Olympics. Throughout the Games, while the noisy Tibetan

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1 “Rebiya Is Major Culprit Behind Terrorist Attacks in Xinjiang”, Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao Online, 12 September 2008.
demonstrations and protest attracted attention from the international arena, China’s real and more serious security threats came from Xinjiang; terror alerts were frequently raised by the Chinese authorities since there were real possibilities of bombings by Xinjiang terrorists (known as East Turkestan Liberation fighters to extremist Islamic groups).

1.5 The other reason for Xinjiang’s prominence is Russia’s move on Georgia which has placed China in a conundrum. China cannot afford to sit by idly while Russia and the West are in conflict. If China does not lend any show of support for or at least show some symbolic solidarity with Russia, its coveted Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which was initiated as a counter-balancing instrument at the height of Chinese fear of rising terrorism in Xinjiang, may diminish in credibility.

1.6 But, at the same time, involving the SCO as a military outfit against separatism and a counterbalance to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is what post-Georgia Russia wants, is against the Chinese doctrine of “peaceful rise” and “harmonious world” and is a move that is certain to provoke Western powers and Japan. China wants to avoid this. Even within the SCO, China is not alone in being wary of Russian intentions of militarizing the organization. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have balanced their Russian ties with US power by hosting both American and Russian military bases (See Appendix B).

1.7 Signs that SCO members are not bandwagoning with Russia against NATO include the Asian Development Bank, in which China plays a leading role, as it has extended a $40 million loan at the lowest possible rate to Georgia, and the SCO, which has also refused to countenance Russia’s recognition of two breakaway regions of Georgia.²

² “Asian displeasure at Russia’s move on Georgia”, IHT, 16 September 2008.
Liberation or terrorism?

2.1 The fate of Xinjiang is now intimately embroiled in the global war on terror. Since the fateful 9/11, China has declared that four “Eastern Turkistan (or ‘东突’分裂勢力 in Chinese)” organizations (the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement ‘东伊运’, the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization, the World Uygur Youth Congress ‘世維会’ and the East Turkistan Information Centre) are linked to al-Qaeda and this was the first time the country has issued a list of terrorist organizations and terrorists.

2.2 Of these organizations, two are of especial importance to the Chinese authorities: the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, identified by the UN as a terrorist organization and funded mainly by Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda network and received training, support and personnel from both the al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, and the Eastern Turkistan Liberation Organization which also received gift money from al-Qaeda and sent its new recruits, all youths from Xinjiang, to training camps in Afghanistan under Taliban support.

2.3 Crimes charged against these organizations include plotting, organizing and executing bombings, assassinations, arsons, poison attacks and other violent terrorist activities in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the rest of China and neighbouring countries since the 1990s. It then becomes a question of how would the US (leader of the so-called War on Terror) react to China’s own mini version of War.

2.4 Signs of trouble for the Chinese government during the Olympics season came early in March 2008 when the Chinese police foiled an attempted sabotage instigated and conducted by the “Eastern Turkistan” separatists on board a Southern Airlines flight and arrested three suspects (known as the ‘3.7炸机’)

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4 Ibid
incident in China⁵. Subsequently, in August 2008, Chinese authorities said two Kashgar men, taxi driver Kurbanjan Hemit, 28, and vegetable vendor Abdurahman Azat, 33, carried out an attack on security forces in the city.⁶

2.5 The Chinese authorities claimed that this attack was part of a long-running effort by Uighur separatists to tarnish the image of the Beijing Olympics and that one of the attackers drove a tip lorry to hit a team of more than 70 policemen who were jogging past the Yiquan Hotel in a regular morning exercise at about 8:00 am while the other suspect threw an explosive toward the gate of the station.⁷ These attacks are known as the “8.4”, “8.10”, and “8.12” cases in Chinese official and media jargon.

2.6 As a result of high alerts and extra security during the Olympics season, the Xinjiang police had cracked five terrorism groups in the first half of 2008, detaining 82 suspected terrorists who allegedly plotted sabotage against the Olympics.⁸ Besides the cell operatives, Beijing has also singled out an individual as the mastermind behind terrorist acts. Rebiya Kadeer may gain the same notoriety in China as Osama Bin Laden had in the US’ global War on Terror.

2.7 According to Nuer Baikeli, Rebiya Kadeer has been associated with incidents of terrorism including explosions, assassinations, arsons, and robberies, the 7 March airplane bombing attempt, 23 March 2008 mass protest and 4 August, 10 August, and 12 August incidents.⁹ In line with the State Council’s proclamation of the multiethnic makeup of Xinjiang, the Xinjiang government charged Rebiya and her organization for crimes against people of various...
nationalities: of “drag[ging] various nationalities in Xinjiang into the abyss of disaster”.10

2.8 What is the US’ take on these terrorist groups? The US government, keen after September 11 to enlist Chinese support in its efforts against Islamist terrorism, agreed to a Chinese request that it co-sponsor the inclusion of a little-known Uighur organization, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), on the UN’s list of terrorist organizations purportedly linked to al-Qaeda and freeze its assets.11 US appeared to be standing with China on this issue.

2.9 But, in December 2003 the US declined to support China’s request to list another Uighur organization, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization.12 Other conflicting signals emerged. Former US President Bush stressed in October 2001 in Shanghai that, “the war on terrorism must never be an excuse to persecute minorities” and US Ambassador Clark Randt similarly stated in January 2002 that “being a valuable member of the coalition does not mean that China… can use terrorism as an excuse to persecute its ethnic minorities.”13

2.10 China has asked the United States for the twenty-two or twenty-three Chinese Uighurs held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba but, in August 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell declared publicly that the US would not return the Uighurs.14

The West applying different standards

3.1 The difference in attitude toward China’s Xinjiang problem between China and the United States is the result of their different perceptions. From the

10 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
perspective of the Chinese government, three important elements stand out in Xinjiang’s history.

3.2 Firstly, according to the Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), since ancient times, Xinjiang has been inhabited by many ethnic groups with different religious beliefs. Thus, Uighur and Islam are not the exclusive ethnicity and religion in Xinjiang. In this interpretation, Han, Kazak, Hui, Mongolian, Kirgiz, Xibe, Tajik, Ozbek, Manchu, Daur, Tatar and Russian also have rightful claims to Xinjiang history as these ethnicities co-exist with each other.

3.3 Secondly, the concept of “East Turkistan” is a recent phenomenon attributed to religious extremists and Western colonialism. According to the State Council, in the early 20th century and later, a small number of separatists and religious extremists in Xinjiang, influenced by the international trend of religious extremism and national chauvinism, politicized the unstandardized geographical term “East Turkistan,” and fabricated an “ideological and theoretical system” on the so-called “independence of East Turkistan” on the basis of the allegation cooked up by the old Western colonialists.16

3.4 Thirdly, after Xinjiang was peacefully liberated on 25 September 1949, its economy and social undertakings have advanced by leaps and bounds in accordance with official Chinese interpretation of history. Beijing immediately started a policy of large-scale bing tuan (兵团) migration into the region, and the proportion of ethnic Chinese increased from 6 percent in 1949 to 41.5 percent by the time of Mao’s death in 1976.18

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
3.5 However, the West perceives the problem differently. In responding to the Chinese government, especially counteracting the third point of the official interpretation, Amnesty International argues that “unemployment remains high among Uighurs and the continued influx of Han Chinese workers into the region has reportedly squeezed Uighurs further out of the labour market”; “the vast majority of Uighurs are farmers; they are not proficient in Chinese and have limited educational and employment opportunities”.

3.6 The Amnesty International report claims that “yet, in recent years, reports indicate that Uighur families have increasingly been forced from their land by Han Chinese property developers without adequate consultation or compensation” while “restrictions on cultural rights have also been tightened in recent years, including the reported banning and burning of tens of thousands of Uighur books and the imposition of an official policy banning Uighur as a language of instruction for most courses at Xinjiang University from September 2002”.

3.7 The western media also note that “the language of the Uighurs is closer to Turkish than Chinese, and the architecture — Islamic domes, decorative Arabic script, grape trellises — looks more to the oasis cities of Central Asia than to the east”, implying that Xinjiang is much less multiethnic as the official interpretation would like it to be.

3.8 What is then the US official position or the perception of the US media on the issue of Xinjiang separatism? There are some conflicting signals from both quarters. In some ways, the US has shown strong support for the Chinese government’s attempt to cope with terrorism in separatist Xinjiang. For example, in the 4 August 2008 terrorist incident, the usually critical Voice of America media reported that the United States strongly condemned the attack. Officially, as well, a US State Department spokesman, Gonzalo Gallegos,


announced that the US extends condolences to the victims and their families and is saddened by the loss of life.\textsuperscript{21}

3.9 On the other hand, in a 19 September 2008 report on religious freedom, the US Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor criticized the Chinese government for its “repression of religious freedom intensified in some areas, including in Tibetan areas and in the Xinjiang…”\textsuperscript{22}

3.10 The US State Department also zeroed in on what it saw as “national regulations preventing children from receiving religious instruction” through Article 14 of the Xinjiang Implementing Measures of the Law on the Protection of Minors which states that “parents or other guardians may not permit minors to be engaged in religious activities”, noting that schools in Xinjiang reportedly require students to attend mandatory classes on Friday, effectively preventing them from attending Friday prayer at the mosque.\textsuperscript{23}

**New Challenges for China and the West**

4.1 As the borders of Xinjiang became more porous in the 1980s, a number of young Uighurs went clandestinely to Pakistan to receive the religious education they could not obtain under China’s policies. Upon their return, they enjoyed great prestige due to their ventures abroad and their knowledge of Koranic theology, far beyond that typical among local imams; as a result, small-scale, localized underground religious organizations started to emerge.\textsuperscript{24}

4.2 Thus, Beijing must be sensitive to the use of terminology like bloody “jihad” against innocent masses since such terms carry pan-Islamic implications and

\textsuperscript{21} “Officials Blame Uighur Muslims for Attack That Killed 16 Chinese Police”, *VOA News*, 4 August 2008


\textsuperscript{24} “Publications Background”, *Human Rights Watch*, April 2005.
may unnecessarily embroil China in Middle Eastern political complexities that have burdened many Western governments.25 Other jargons that may invoke Bush-like Axis of Evil doctrine include Beijing invoking the imagery of the “three evil forces” inside and outside China who collude with each other and with a command center outside of China that issues orders to carry out the conspiracies in China.26

4.3 Again such terminologies may have global connotations in Middle Eastern politics. Beijing must realize that it has, up till now, been relatively unburdened by the sort of imperialism/colonialism and religious overtones that have tainted Western relations with the Middle East. China should keep off from those boundary markers as far as possible by being sensitive to the rise of Islam and detach terrorism from religiosity.

4.4 For the moment, China’s strategy is both hard and soft. Hard in cracking down on terrorist cells and soft on augmented economic development (including Xinjiang’s energy resources such as Tarim Basin) as a means to deliver progress and economic rewards to the people of Xinjiang to combat poverty as a long term strategy to curb separatism and terrorism.

4.5 In the meantime, the West (especially the US) must also make a strategic decision to complement China on this leg of the global War on Terror or to use it to contain China by promoting separatism or democratization (e.g. colour revolutions along the lines of Georgia). In doing so, it may inadvertently tilt China towards post-Georgia Russia and the SCO along with it.

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26 Ibid.
APPENDIX A

A member of the security forces keeping order for people and traffic next to the scene where a bomb attack took place earlier in the day in Kashgar. (Source: “Jihad in China’s Far West”, TIME, 6 August 2008.)

APPENDIX B

US forces in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan has balanced her Russian ties with US power by hosting both American and Russian military bases. (Source: “俄罗斯将联合中亚四国组建国际联军对抗北约”, 环球时报, 16 September 2008.)
APPENDIX C

Chronology of terrorism and separatism in Xinjiang

February 5, 1992: Urumqi Bus Bombs. Three were killed and twenty-three injured in two explosions on buses in Urumqi; the PRC’s 2002 document claims that other bombs were discovered and defused around the same time in a cinema and a residential building. Five men were later convicted in this case and reportedly executed in June 1995.

February 1992-September 1993: Bombings. During this period there were several explosions in Yining, Urumqi, Kashgar, and elsewhere; targets included department stores, markets, hotels, and centers of “cultural activity” in southern Xinjiang. A bomb in a building of the Nongji Company (apparently a firm concerned with agricultural equipment) in Kashgar killed two and injured six on June 17, 1993. A bomb went off in a wing of the Seman Hotel in Kashgar, though no one was hurt in the explosion. The PRC’s 2002 document claims that in the 1993 explosions two people were killed and thirty-six injured overall.

July 7, 1995: Khotan Demonstration. Preceding this event, the Chinese authorities had arrested two imams of the Baytulla mosque in Khotan for discussing current events in their Koranic teaching and replaced them with a new imam, the young and charismatic Abdul Kayum. When Kayum began to advocate improved women’s rights in his sermons, he too was arrested for raising proscribed topical issues. Some days later, on July 7, a crowd converged at a party and government office compound near the mosque, demanding information about the imam’s whereabouts. When the confrontation turned violent, the government called in large numbers of riot police who trapped the demonstrators in the compound, deployed tear gas, and arrested and beat many of them. Official reports mention injuries to 66 officials and police but supply no figures regarding demonstrator casualties. This event is not mentioned in the PRC document on East Turkistan terrorism.

April-June 1996: Protests, Assassinations, Bombings, Crackdown. Reports indicate an increase in violent protests and official repression in the spring of 1996. International newspapers and wire services provide vague and unconfirmed accounts of numerous uprisings or protests throughout Xinjiang; some exiled Uyghur sources claim injuries in the hundreds and as many as 18,000 arrests. Specific incidents in this period include bombings in Kucha (alleged to have killed four) and assassinations in the Kashgar, Kucha, and Aksu areas of Uyghur officials belonging to the Islamic Association of China and a Uyghur deputy to the XUAR People’s Congress.

February 5-8, 1997: Yining (Ghulja) Incident. Official Chinese reports are themselves inconsistent on the causes and nature of this event—ranging from denials that it happened, to calling it a case of “beating, smashing, and looting” by “drug addicts, looters, and ‘social garbage,’” and to blaming it on separatists and religious elements bent on stirring up holy war. The PRC’s 2002 document blames this “serious riot” on the “East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah’ and some other terrorist organizations.” (The document does not mention this group in any other context or attribute any other activity in Xinjiang or abroad to it; nor are there any references to it in other sources.)
March 1997: Disturbance at the Chinese Consulate-General in Istanbul. The PRC’s 2002 document on East Turkistan terrorism claims that shots were fired at the Chinese consulate-general in Turkey in March 1997 and a flag was burned during a demonstration. Independent news sources reported on the flag burning (on February 8, 1997, following the Yining Incident) but not the gunfire.

1998: Attack on Hashir Wahidi, Founder and Head of the Uyghur Liberation Organization. Wahidi was attacked in his house in Kazakhstan by unknown assailants and died a few months later, allegedly from injuries he sustained in the beating. The Uyghur Liberation Organization later merged with the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan to form the Uyghuristan People’s Party.

February-April 1998: Bombings. The PRC’s 2002 document refers to six explosions at economic and industrial targets, including a gas pipeline near Qaghiliq, in February and March 1998. The bombs caused damage amounting to roughly $120,000. The following month eight bombs went off at homes and offices of officials in the same county, including that of the Public Security Bureau and a local CPPCC chairman. Eight people were injured by these explosions.

May 31 and June 1, 1998: Osh Bus Bombings. Two explosions, one on a bus and one in a piece of luggage that had been removed from a bus, killed five people in Osh oblast, Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz authorities apprehended and sentenced a Turk, a Russian, and two Uyghurs for the bombing.

1999: Series of attacks on Chinese in Turkey. In October, Turkish police detained ten individuals, said to be members of East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), in connection with assaults on Chinese nationals.

July-September 1999: Trouble in Khotan. Sporadic incidents of attacks on public security personnel, offices, and Han Chinese in the Khotan area, as well as arson of cotton stocks. In September 1999, police shot and killed a man described as “a terrorist leader” and arrested 21 others with him.

January 2000: Possible Attack on Aksu Area Police Station. One US newspaper reported that in early January 2000, militants attacked a police station “in the isolated town of Aksu,” kidnapping five policemen. (Aksu is in fact a major city on the region’s main east-west highway.) The attackers were later apprehended after a raid on their headquarters and a dramatic shootout with police helicopters.

March 2000: Involvement with Chechens. Russia arrested two Uyghurs for fighting for the Chechen terrorists. Extradited to the PRC for trial, they confessed to smuggling ammunition but denied joining the fighting. According to some reports, they were in fact cooks. (It is a commonly held stereotype in Central Asia that Uyghurs excel at food preparation; there are many Uyghur restaurants across the region.)

March 2000: Assassination of Nigmat Bazakov. Bazakov was the second president of Ittipaq, a Uyghur cultural organization affiliated with the Kyrgyzstan People’s Kurultay (Congress). According to official versions, Bazakov was shot by members of ETLO (or SHAT) after he refused to cooperate with them and make donations.
April-May 2000: Bazaar Fires, Attack on Chinese Delegation, and Kidnapping of a Chinese Businessman. In April 2000, a fire broke out in a Bishkek market (the Tour Bazaar) specializing in Chinese commodities; in May, members of a Chinese delegation sent to investigate the fire (Chinese citizens with Turkic names) were attacked in their car near a hotel in Bishkek; the Kyrgyz driver and a member of the Chinese delegation were killed; two other Chinese citizens were wounded. The day after the shooting, a second fire broke out in the Tour Bazaar. Later in May, a Chinese businessman was kidnapped in Osh and a ransom of $100,000 was demanded for his release. The Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO; Uyghur Azatliq Täshkilati) stands accused of these crimes in the PRC’s 2002 document; another source credits them to ETLO. The perpetrators allegedly fled to Kazakhstan where they killed two policemen before being apprehended. Four Uyghurs were sentenced to death for the murder of the Chinese delegation members.

June 2002: Senior Chinese Diplomat and Uyghur Businessman Killed in Bishkek. Wang Jianping, first secretary of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, was shot while driving in a Mercedes with a Uyghur businessman, Umar Nurmukhamedov. Kyrgyz officials speculated at the time that it was Nurmukhamedov, not the Chinese consular official, who was the primary target in what may have been a contract killing. Informal reports claim that a cache of forged passports was found in the Mercedes’ trunk at the time of the shooting. Two ethnic Uyghurs (Kyrgyzstan and Turkey nationals), said to be members of ETLO, were extradited in August 2002 to China by Kyrgyz authorities for the crime; however, the Kyrgyzstan interior minister, Bakirdin Subanbekov, publicly stated his belief that the crime was economic, not political, in nature. The suspects were in possession of weapons and multiple passports at the time of their arrest.

March 2003: Bus Attack near Naryn, Kyrgyzstan. A highway bus was attacked while traveling toward China from Kyrgyzstan along the mountain route often used by traders. The assailants killed 22 people, including 19 Chinese citizens, and burned the bus. In July 2003, Kyrgyz authorities announced that two of the killers had escaped to Turkey and were members of ETLO.

June 2004: Protests began outside the offices of a reservoir and hydropower station planned for the local Tekas River, according to US-based Radio Free Asia. Authorities plan to move about 18,000 farmers, forestry workers and herders to make way for the reservoir, but protesters said they were paid only 880 yuan (about US$100) out of 38,000 yuan (US$4,600) promised to them, the station said, citing anonymous witnesses.

January 22, 2005: Thirteen persons were killed and 18 others injured in two separate explosions in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region coinciding with the Eid-al-Adha religious festival.

2006: Huseyin Celil, a China-born Uygur described by Chinese authorities as a prominent member of “East Turkistan” terrorist organizations, was given refugee status by Canada in 2001. He was arrested in Uzbekistan in 2006 and extradited to China soon afterwards.
January 2007: Chinese police raided a training camp in Xinjiang killing 18 terrorist suspects and one policeman. Seventeen more suspects were reported captured and explosives seized. The raid was said to have provided new evidence of ties to “international terrorist forces.”

7 March 2008: Chinese police foiled an attempted sabotage instigated and conducted by the “Eastern Turkistan” separatists on board a Southern Airlines flight and arrested three suspects (known as the 「3.7」 炸机 incident in China).

August 2008: Chinese authorities say two Kashgar men, taxi driver Kurbanjan Hemit, 28, and vegetable vendor Abdurahman Azat, 33, attacked security forces in the city.

Sources:

“Convicted Xinjiang terrorist sentenced to life in prison”, People’s Daily, 20 April 2007

Ma, Dazheng, Guojialiyi Gaoyuyiqie (China: Xinjiang Renmin Chubanshe), 2002.

